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Abstract
Background: Several studies on patient safety have shown that a substantial number of patients
suffer from unintended harm caused by healthcare management in hospitals. Emergency
departments (EDs) are challenging hospital settings with regard to patient safety. There is an
increased sense of urgency to take effective countermeasures in order to improve patient safety.
This can only be achieved if interventions tackle the dominant underlying causes. The objectives of
our study are to examine the nature and causes of unintended events in EDs and the relationship
between type of event and causal factor structure.
Methods: Study at EDs of 10 hospitals in the Netherlands. The study period per ED was 8 to 14
weeks, in which staff were asked to report unintended events. Unintended events were broadly
defined as all events, no matter how seemingly trivial or commonplace, that were unintended and
could have harmed or did harm a patient. Reports were analysed with a Root Cause Analysis tool
(PRISMA) by an experienced researcher.
Results: 522 unintended events were reported. Of the events 25% was related to cooperation
with other departments and 20% to problems with materials/equipment. More than half of the
events had consequences for the patient, most often resulting in inconvenience or suboptimal care.
Most root causes were human (60%), followed by organisational (25%) and technical causes (11%).
Nearly half of the root causes was external, i.e. attributable to other departments in or outside the
hospital.
Conclusion: Event reporting gives insight into diverse unintended events. The information on
unintended events may help target research and interventions to increase patient safety. It seems
worthwhile to direct interventions on the collaboration between the ED and other hospital
departments.
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Several studies in various countries have shown that a sub-
stantial number of patients suffer from adverse events in
hospitals. [1-9] These studies have reported adverse event
incidence rates ranging from 3% to 17% of all hospital
admissions, with 25% to 50% of the adverse events con-
sidered preventable. The Harvard Medical Practice Study
found that the third most common site of adverse events
in hospitals is the emergency department (ED) and 70%
of these events are due to negligence.[10] The Utah and
Colorado study confirmed that adverse events in emer-
gency medicine are highly preventable: the ED had the
largest percentage of negligent adverse events (53%).[3]
The ED is a challenging hospital setting because high
patient throughput, heavy dependence on services outside
the ED (laboratory, radiology, consulting services etc.)
and the diversity of clinical conditions presented.[11]
Emergency care providers often have to work under con-
ditions involving disrupted sleep cycles, multiple inter-
ruptions and acute time constraints, and they have to
institute major medical interventions for patients with
limited historical and diagnostic information.[12] Since
large numbers of patients visit the ED, the incidence rate
of adverse events in the ED and the large proportion that
is preventable are alarming and require interventions. An
increase in patient safety can only be achieved if these
interventions tackle the right underlying causes.
Event reporting systems can provide valuable information
for detecting patient safety issues in hospitals.[13] Gener-
ally, healthcare providers are not restricted to report only
adverse events with patient harm in the reporting system.
Other unintended events are considered useful sources of
information as well. Unintended events are a broader
group of events -including near misses-, that do not nec-
essarily result in patient harm and occur more frequently
than adverse events. Near misses are believed to share the
same underlying failure factors as accidents that do reach
the patient.[14] Evidence for this common cause hypoth-
esis has been examined in a review of Wright and Van der
Schaaf for the railway domain.[15]
With the present study, we want to examine the causes of
various types of unintended events in the ED by analysing
unintended event reports. Event reports can be helpful in
capturing system defects (latent errors) and near misses
that may not be detected by reviews of patient
records.[16] Two earlier studies used reports to examine
unintended events in the ED.[12,17] These studies had
some methodological limitations. Both studies took place
in only one hospital. The study period of Fordyce et
al.[12] was only one week and Tighe et al.[17] used a data-
base of event reports which contained little information
on contributing factors. Moreover, they had no opportu-
nity to interview involved healthcare providers. We tried
to improve these designs by carrying out a study over a
longer period in multiple centres, allowing for generalisa-
tion of the results, and by using interviews to complete the
event reports.
The objectives of our study are to gain more insight into
(1) the nature of unintended events in the ED, (2) the
causes of unintended events in the ED and (3) the rela-
tionship between the type of event and the causal factor
structure.
Methods
Study design and setting
From October 2006 to December 2007, an observational
study was performed to examine the causes of unintended
events at the emergency department (ED) of ten hospitals
in the Netherlands: one university hospital, three tertiary
teaching hospitals and six general hospitals. Unintended
events were broadly defined as all events, no matter how
seemingly trivial or commonplace, that were unintended
and could have harmed or did harm a patient.[18] The
study protocol was granted ethical approval by the VU
University Medical Centre review board in Amsterdam.
The intake of departments was phased, because -for logis-
tical reasons- we did not want all EDs to participate in the
study simultaneously. The study period per ED was eight
to fourteen weeks depending on the reporting speed.
Healthcare providers (i.e. nurses, resident physicians,
medical consultants) and clerks at the department were
asked to report all unintended events that occurred, both
when they were involved in an event and when they wit-
nessed an event. In order to find the causes underlying the
reported unintended events, the events were analysed by
an experienced researcher using a Root Cause Analysis
(RCA) tool called PRISMA-medical.[19,20] In addition,
the unintended events were classified into one of the eight
classes that we formulated after completion of the study
by looking at common themes in the reported events:
Materials and equipment, Diagnosis and treatment, Med-
ication, Protocols and regulations, Incorrect data and sub-
stitutions, Collaboration with resident physicians and
consultants, Collaboration with other departments and
Other.
Data collection
Reporting procedure
Before the start of the study, ED-staff received an oral and
written instruction about the aim and procedure of the
study. They had two alternatives for reporting the unin-
tended events: a report card or report form. On the pock-
etsize report card, the name of the reporter, the moment
in time, and a description of the event were requested. The
report form was more elaborate and additionallyPage 2 of 11
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care, place, some patient characteristics and consequences
for the patient. A letter box was placed at the department
to drop the report cards and forms. Our intention was to
gather at least 50 reports per department to be able to dray
valid causal factor profiles of each department. A mini-
mum of fifty reports is recommended to capture the vari-
ety of possible unintended events (Prof. dr. T. van der
Schaaf, personal communication). Staff were encouraged
to report unintended events by a two-weekly newsletter,
reminders during team meetings and appealing activities
to direct staff's attention to reporting.
Once or twice a week a researcher visited the ED to collect
the written reports and ask the reporters some questions
about the reported events in short interviews. Each event
report was followed by an interview with the reporter,
mainly to get information on contributing factors. In case
the reporter had used a report card, the additional infor-
mation requested on the elaborate report form was also
obtained during this interview.
Occasionally, questions were asked by telephone. No
interviews were held with staff in other hospital depart-
ments than the ED.
PRISMA analysis
All unintended events were analysed with PRISMA-medi-
cal. PRISMA is a tool to analyse the root causes of a broad
set of unintended events.[19,20] The corresponding tax-
onomy to classify the root causes, the Eindhoven Classifi-
cation Model, has been accepted by the World Alliance for
Patient Safety of the World Health Organization.[21,22] It
is based on the system approach to human error of Reason
[23,24] and the Skill-Rules-Knowledge based behaviour
model of Rasmussen.[25]
PRISMA examines the relative contributions of latent fac-
tors (technical and organisational), active failures
(human) and other factors (patient related and other).
Unintended events are analysed in three main steps.
Firstly, a causal tree is formulated. At the top of the tree a
short description of the event is placed, as the starting
point for the analysis. Below the top event, all involved
direct causes are mentioned. These direct causes often
have their own causes. By continuing to ask "why" for
each event or action, beginning with the top event, all rel-
evant causes are revealed. In this way a structure of causes
arises, until the root causes are identified at the bottom of
the tree (see Figure 1). In our study, this first phase was
ended when there was no more objective information of
underlying causes available. Presumptions of the report-
ers about possible causes were not recorded in the causal
tree.
Secondly, the identified root causes are classified with the
Eindhoven Classification Model (ECM).[19,20,26] This
taxonomy distinguishes five main categories and 20 sub-
categories (see Table 1).
Eventually, by aggregating the classifications of root
causes of at least 50 events, a so called PRISMA profile can
be delineated, which shows in a graphical representation
the relative contributions of the different root causes and
gives direction to the development of preventive strate-
gies.[19,20]
The analyst of the unintended events in the ED was a PhD
candidate on patient safety in hospitals and also one of
the authors of this paper (MS). She was trained in the
PRISMA method. In a previous paper, we examined the
inter-rater reliability of formulating root causes in causal
trees and classifying the root causes with the ECM.[27]
The reliability analyses were performed with a sample of
event reports from a larger database of events than used
for the current study. Next to the current ED-reports, this
database also contained reports from surgery and internal
medicine departments. The agreement in formulating
root causes of unintended events, expressed as a mean
score between 0 and 3, was good (2.0). The inter-rater reli-
ability for the number of root causes used in the causal
tree, was moderate (κ = 0.45). The inter-rater reliability of
classifying root causes with the ECM taxonomy was sub-
stantial at main category level (κ = 0.70) and subcategory
level (complete taxonomy) (κ = 0.63).
Statistical analysis
The data of the reports were first summarised using
descriptive statistics and frequency tables. All analyses
were performed with 522 cases (N = 522 unintended
events), except for the analysis of the relative frequencies
of causes per event type. The frequencies per event type
were calculated using the 845 root causes as cases (N =
845 root causes), because we wanted the percentages in
the bars to sum up to 100% to increase the comprehensi-
bility of the figure. SPSS 14.0 was used to perform the sta-
tistical analyses.
Results
Characteristics of reported unintended events
The total number of events reported was 522, ranging
from 46 to 71 per ED, with an average of 52 reports (SD =
7.6). In total, there were 743 reporting days during which
189 different employees reported one or more unin-
tended events. Most reports were made by nurses (85%).
Resident physicians or consultants reported 13% of the
unintended events and clerical staff reported 2%. In 83%
of the unintended events, the reporter was directly
involved in the event.Page 3 of 11
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tended events are listed. Most events (44%) were known
to have occurred during daytime hours and 34% during
evening and night. For 22% of the unintended events, the
reporter did not specify or know at what time the event
occurred. The phase in ED care in which most events
occurred was medical examinations/tests (36%). More
than half of the unintended events (56%) had conse-
quences for the patient. In 45% of these events with con-
sequences for patients, the patient suffered some
inconvenience, for example prolonged waiting time. In
30% the patient received suboptimal care, for example a
delay in starting antibiotics treatment. For smaller groups
of patients the outcomes were more severe, e.g. extra inter-
vention (8%), pain (6%), physical injury (3%).
Table 3 shows the types of events that were reported with
some examples. A quarter of the unintended events was
related to the cooperation with other departments, e.g.
with laboratories and nursing wards. In 20% of the unin-
tended events, there were problems with materials or
equipment. Furthermore, relatively large parts of unin-
tended events were related to the collaboration with resi-
dent physicians and consultants (17%) or to diagnosis
and treatment (14%).
Causes of unintended events
All 522 unintended events were analysed with PRISMA,
resulting in 845 root causes. Fifty percent of the unin-
tended events had one root cause, 39% had two root
causes, 10% three root causes and 1% four root causes.
The mean number of root causes per unintended event
was 1.62 (SD = 0.71).
In Figure 2, the distributions of the five main groups of
root causes per event type are shown. Overall, most root
causes were human (60%), followed by organisational
(25%) and technical (11%) root causes. Unintended
events related to materials and equipment were relatively
often caused by technical factors. Incorrect data and sub-
stitutions were caused for a large part by human errors,
while organisational factors contributed most to unin-
tended events related to protocols and regulations.
Table 4 shows the frequencies of the causes on subcate-
gory level (see also Table 1 for explanation of the ECM cat-
egories). Material defects (TM) were the most common
technical factors (38% of unintended events with techni-
cal causes). External factors were largely present, espe-
cially human and organisational external factors (H-ex
and O-ex). These are causes originating in another depart-
ment outside the ED, e.g. the laboratory or radiology. Of
all 845 root causes, 387 (46%) were external. In 69% of
the unintended events with human causes, an external
human factor contributed to the event, for example: the
surgeon on duty was in the operating room and forgot to
pass the beeper to a fellow surgeon, or a laboratory worker
forgot to insert a patient's test results in the computer. In
58% of the unintended events with organisational causes,
there was an external organisational factor, for example a
laboratory worker saved blood pipes until the testing
machine was full or a hospital admission stop was
ignored by a medical consultant.
When looking at the internal causes inside the ED, human
intervention errors (HRI) stand out (22% of unintended
events with human causes). Examples of intervention
errors are: not recording the time when medication was
administered or not plugging the battery of a medical
device in the socket. Moreover, errors with regard to pro-
tocols (OP) and management priorities (OM) are rela-
tively frequent organisational causes (respectively 19%
and 17% of all unintended events with organisational
causes), for example protocols that were incomplete or
old medical devices that were not replaced by hospital
management.
Discussion
General findings and interpretation
We gathered and analysed a large number of unintended
events (522) using a root cause analysis tool based on the
sound theoretical frameworks of Reason and Rasmussen,
which is accepted by the WHO and which has a good reli-
ability.[27]
The results show that a large number of unintended
events occur in the collaboration with departments out-
side the ED (laboratory, radiology, consulting services
etc). Staff in the ED are heavily dependent on these serv-
ices. The problems in the cooperation with outside serv-
ices can also be noticed in the phase of care in which
unintended events mainly come about -medical examina-
Example of a causal treeFigure 1
Example of a causal tree.
Top event description
Arterial pressure of patient X
registered in medical record
of patient Y
Direct cause/
Root cause
Nurse clicks on wrong
patient number in electronic
record system
Direct cause/
Root cause
Nurse does not correct
faulty test result in
record of patient Y
Root cause
Deletion of test 
results not permitted
in electronic system
Root cause
Nurse does not make
notes about error in
patient record
Code HSS
Code TD Code HRIPage 4 of 11
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Table 1: Description of categories of the Eindhoven Classification Model: PRISMA-medical version[19,20]
Main 
category
Subcategory Code Description
Latent 
conditions
Technical External T-ex Technical failures beyond the control and responsibility of the 
investigating organisation.
Design TD Failures due to poor design of equipment, software, labels or 
forms.
Construction TC Correct design, which was not constructed properly or was set 
up in inaccessible areas.
Materials TM Material defects not classified under TD or TC.
Organisational External O-ex Failures at an organisational level beyond the control and 
responsibility of the investigating organisation, such as in another 
department of area (address by collaborative systems).
Transfer of knowledge OK Failures resulting from inadequate measures taken to ensure that 
situational or domain-specific knowledge or information is 
transferred to all new or inexperienced staff.
Protocols OP Failures relating to the quality and availability of the protocols 
within the department (too complicated, inaccurate, unrealistic, 
absent, or poorly presented).
Management priorities OM Internal management decisions in which safety is relegated to an 
inferior position when faced with conflicting demands or 
objectives. This is a conflict between production needs and 
safety. Example: decisions that are made about staffing levels.
Culture OC Failures resulting from collective approach and its attendant 
modes of behaviour to risks in the investigating organisation.
Active errors
Human External H-ex Human failures originating beyond the control and responsibility 
of the investigating organisation. This could apply to individuals in 
another department.
Knowledge-based 
behaviour
Knowledge-based 
behaviour
HKK The inability of an individual to apply their existing knowledge to 
a novel situation. Example: a trained blood bank technologist 
who is unable to solve a complex antibody identification 
problem.
Rule-based behaviour Qualifications HRQ The incorrect fit between an individuals training or education 
and a particular task. Example: expecting a technician to solve 
the same type of difficult problems as a technologists.
Coordination HRC A lack of task coordination within a healthcare team in an 
organisation. Example: an essential task not being performed 
because everyone thought that someone else had completed the 
task.
Verification HRV The correct and complete assessment of a situation including 
related conditions of the patient and materials to be used before 
starting the intervention. Example: failure to correctly identify a 
patient by checking the wristband.
Intervention HRI Failures that result from faulty task planning and execution. 
Example: washing red cells by the same protocol as platelets.
Monitoring HRM Monitoring a process or patient status. Example: a trained 
technologist operating an automated instrument and not 
realising that a pipette dispenses reagents is clogged.
Skill-based behaviour Slips HSS Failures in performance of highly developed skills. Example: a 
technologist adding drops of reagents to a row of test tubes and 
than missing the tube or a computer entry error.
Tripping HST Failures in whole body movements. These errors are often 
referred to as " slipping, tripping, or falling". Examples: a blood 
bag slipping out of one' s hands and breaking or tripping over a 
loose tile on the floor.
Other factors
Patient related Patient related factor PRF Failures related to patient characteristics or conditions, which 
are beyond the control of staff and influence treatment.
Other Unclassifiable X Failures that cannot be classified in any other category.
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departments.
Half of all reported events reached the patient directly,
most often resulting in inconvenience or suboptimal care.
The causes of the unintended events were mainly human,
though system factors (organisational and technical) were
established as well. Predominance by human causes is
also found in the aviation industry. It is estimated that
approximately 75 percent of all aviation accidents are
related to human errors.[28] Nearly half of all causes we
found were external, meaning that an individual's behav-
iour, technical factors or organisational factors at an out-
side department contributed to the unintended event.
This also confirms the finding that there are problems in
the cooperation with other departments, although we
have to bear in mind that people feel less constrained
reporting unintended events originating in other depart-
ments than in their own.
Unintended events related to materials and equipment
were relatively often caused by technical factors. Incorrect
data and substitutions were for a relatively large part
caused by human errors, while organisational factors con-
tributed most to unintended events related to protocols
and regulations.
Some comments have to be made for a good interpreta-
tion of the causes of the unintended events. Firstly, the
reported unintended events were related to patient care,
and healthcare providers were somehow involved in all
events. This resulted in involvement of human causes in
many cases. The PRISMA analysis, however, did focus on
identifying accompanying system factors, beside these
Table 2: Clinical characteristics of unintended events
Characteristic unintended event No. of unintended events (%)
Time (N = 522)
Daytime (7 am to 5 pm) 227 (43.5)
Evening and night (5 pm to 7 am) 178 (34.1)
Unknown 117 (22.4)
Phase of care* (N = 522)
Medical examination/tests 186 (36.1)
ED stay general 84 (16.3)
Medication 48 (9.3)
Treatment/intervention 35 (6.8)
Transfer of patient 33 (6.4)
Acute situation 26 (5.0)
Hospitalisation 25 (4.9)
Discharge 12 (2.3)
Handover 9 (1.7)
Triage 6 (1.2)
Other 84 (16.3)
Consequences for patient (N = 522)
Yes (see 'outcome') 294 (56.3)
No 211 (40.4)
Unknown 17 (3.3)
Outcome* (N = 294)†
Inconvenience
e.g. long waiting time; high temperature in ED; patient mistakenly sent to another hospital
134 (45.1)
Suboptimal care
e.g. delay in starting antibiotics treatment; no surveillance of sick patient; patient mistakenly sent home
90 (30.3)
Extra intervention
e.g. extra blood withdrawal, unnecessary X-ray
25 (8.4)
Pain
e.g. no pain medication; missed bone fracture; no sling given after stitching of thumb wound.
19 (6.4)
Physical injury
e.g. decubitus ulcer; eyelid glued
10 (3.4)
Mental injury
e.g. wrong patient called back to hospital for positive test result; relatives informed about HIV of patient 
without patient's consent
6 (2.0)
Longer stay (> 24 hrs)
e.g. admission to a nursing department
2 (0.7)
Unknown 20 (6.7)
* For a number of unintended events, more than one category was selected.
† Only the groups of patients that experienced consequences of the unintended event.Page 6 of 11
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mation about underlying causes, presumptions of the
reporters about possible organisational or technical
causes were not recorded in the causal tree. Finally, a lack
of organisational or technical barriers was not labeled as
an organisational or technical cause. An example: when
two healthcare providers make the same laboratory
request for a patient, blood is taken unnecessarily once.
An automatic electronic signaling system would have pre-
vented the double laboratory request, but as long as such
a system does not exist at the ED, this system can not be
regarded as a cause. Yet, improvements of organisational
procedures or technique can arise from the identification
of human errors.
Limitations
The unintended events identified in our study are unlikely
to be a random sample of all unintended events occurring
in the ED, whereas not all unintended events that took
place will have been reported. Since the healthcare provid-
ers making the reports were often directly involved in the
patients' care and since the reporting was not anonymous,
it is possible that certain mistakes were under-reported
because they were embarrassed or afraid of condemnation
by the researchers or colleagues. This may have biased the
results towards the reporting of less significant events,
events without consequences for the patient and errors
originating in other departments, because these are 'safer'
to report. Anonymous reporting would perhaps have
yielded more events, but interviewing the reporters -essen-
tial for obtaining information on contributing factors-
would not have been possible in that case. Some unin-
tended events occurred multiple times at one ED, and
some healthcare providers informed us not to be willing
to report these events over and over again. Examples are
long waiting times for laboratory test results or for (paper)
patient records from the records archive. We do not know
exactly which events were under-reported, how frequently
they occurred and whether they had the same underlying
causes in every case. Therefore, we were not able to correct
for this under-reporting by giving different weights to
these types of events and their causes. Finally, most unin-
Table 3: Types of unintended events
Unintended event type No. of unintended events (%)
(N = 522)
Collaboration with other departments 128 (24.5)
e.g. long waiting time for laboratory test results
e.g. not al requested X-rays made at radiology department
e.g. difficulties finding a place at a nursing ward for the patient
Materials and equipment 106 (20.3)
e.g. ear thermometer gives inaccurate measurements
e.g. error in electronic record system (unable to look up medical history of patient)
e.g. materials lacking for treatment of patient
Collaboration with resident physicians and consultants 89 (17.0)
e.g. long waiting time for resident or consultant to come
e.g. insufficient supervision of resident physicians
e.g. not able to reach resident or consultant
Diagnosis and treatment 75 (14.4)
e.g. no plaster bandage applied after fracture reposition
e.g. eyelid glued when gluing nose bridge
e.g. elbow injury overlooked
Incorrect data and substitutions 39 (7.5)
e.g. incorrect date on X-ray
e.g. appointment form given to wrong patient
e.g. sticker with personal information of wrong patient pasted on laboratory request form
Medication 38 (7.3)
e.g. prescription of medicine in incorrect dose
e.g. medication expired
e.g. medication instruction accomplished twice
Protocols and regulations 20 (3.8)
e.g. inconsistency in protocols
e.g. protocol untraceable on the intranet
e.g. staff not familiar with procedure in new protocol
Other 27 (5.2)
e.g. inadequate transport of patient
e.g. dangerous ground sill at entrance of ED
e.g. patient leaves hospital without being dischargedPage 7 of 11
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study mainly gives an idea about events related to nursing
care and to a lesser extent to care processes by residents
and specialists in the ED.
Another limitation may have had an effect on the root
causes identified. The interviews about the events depend
on the recall of the reporter. However, we strived for a
small time lag between the occurrence of the event and the
interview. Events were discussed within a few days, with a
maximum time lag of three weeks in some exceptional
cases.
Comparison with previous studies
As we mentioned in the introduction, two other event
reporting studies have been performed in hospital EDs in
the past. Fordyce et al.[12] examined 346 error reports.
The area of emergency care in which most events occurred
was 'diagnostic studies'. In their study of 174 event
reports, Tighe et al.[17] found that the largest category of
events concerned delays, for example difficulties in
arranging for a patient to be seen promptly by a medical
specialist. These findings correspond to our results, as the
most frequently reported unintended events in our study
concerned the collaboration with services outside the ED
performing diagnostic tests and the collaboration with
medical consultants, mainly resulting in delays for the
patient. Another large group of events -problems with
materials and equipment- was not found in the other two
studies.
In both studies, as well as in our study, only small num-
bers of events had severe consequences for the patient:
Fordyce et al.[12] found adverse outcomes in 2% of the
reports and in the study of Tighe et al.[17], approximately
11% of the reported events were classified as 'serious'.
However, we cannot compare the causes identified in our
study with these previous studies. Fordyce et al.[12] did
not investigate causes of errors and Tighe et al.[17] stated
that the reports in their database did not include enough
information on contributing factors.
Implications for practice
We recommend improving the collaboration between the
ED and other hospital departments, while a large number
of unintended events occur in the collaboration with
departments outside the ED and nearly half of all causes
were external. A reduction of the external factors is not
only the responsibility of these external departments. We
believe that EDs and other departments should jointly
discuss these causes and work on improvement plans for
safe patient care across hospital departments (e.g. improv-
ing communication during consultations of medical spe-
cialists and agreements with laboratory about the
processing of lab requests).
Causes of unintended events were predominantly labelled
as human. In 2008, the Dutch Society of Medical Special-
ists, among others, has formulated a national patient
safety action campaign for hospitals 'Prevent harm, work
safely' that contains interventions directed at reducing
human error. Elements of the programme are: education
about patient safety, team training and evaluations of the
Individual Functioning of Medical Specialists (IFMS),
including the construction of a personal portfolio, a per-
sonal progress plan and annual interviews about quality
of care and communication with colleagues and
patients.[29] These interventions might be valuable for
hospitals, and more specifically EDs, in other countries
too. However, improvement efforts should not be solely
directed at the behaviour of healthcare personnel. Many
of the unintended events were caused by a combination of
latent factors (organisational or technical) and active
(human) factors. We therefore recommend interventions
to be aimed at the system that surrounds healthcare pro-
fessionals. Great gains in safety can be achieved through
relatively small modifications of equipment and work-
places [30,31]. Examples are a decrease in the variability
of procedures or the design of devices which reduces men-
tal workload and decision-making (e.g. a single telephone
number across the country for calling resuscitation teams
or colour coding for alerts on patient wristbands)[31] and
building in barriers in the system when an error is made
(e.g. a computer signal in case of a contraindication).
Finally, we believe that event reporting and analysis gives
valuable insight into the nature and causes of unintended
events. The PRISMA method to analyse events is a useful
tool to examine large numbers of events to uncover latent
Distribution of main causal factor groups per unintended event type (N = 845)Figure 2
Distribution of main causal factor groups per unin-
tended event type (N = 845).Page 8 of 11
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researchers, clinicians and managers. In the Netherlands,
many hospitals start using PRISMA to study events
reported by their staff. Most hospitals are taking on decen-
tralised (department-level) event reporting with in each
department a special committee that has the task to ana-
lyse the reported events, give staff feedback and design
and implement improvements.
Recommendations for future research
While in most unintended events in our study no harm
for the patient was involved, only a small number of the
unintended events would have met the criteria of an
adverse event: 1) an unintended (physical and/or mental)
injury which 2) results in temporary or permanent disa-
bility, death or prolongation of hospital stay, and is 3)
caused by health care management rather than the
patient's disease. The events in our study were not
assessed by physician reviewers on these criteria. It is
unclear whether the results regarding the causes of the
broad group of unintended events we examined are also
applicable to the specific group of adverse events.
Although the common cause hypothesis of near misses
and accidents is supported by research in the railway sec-
tor[15], future research is needed to examine the resem-
blance of the causal factor structures of unintended events
and adverse events in the healthcare domain.
Our study mainly gives an idea about events related to
nursing care. To get a more complete view of all unin-
tended events that occur, we recommend expanding the
reporting of events with patient record review. The report
of Wagner et al.[32] showed that there was almost no
overlap in the events reported by staff and the events iden-
tified trough patient record review. The unintended events
identified in patient records were more often related to
medical care by physicians, than the events that were
reported by staff. Record review can be considered as an
important additional source to voluntary reporting of
unintended events, primarily to find more unintended
events related to physician/specialist care.
Conclusion
Our study shows that event reporting gives insight into
diverse unintended events that occur within healthcare,
especially nursing care. The majority of unintended events
Table 4: Causes of unintended events at the emergency department
Main category Subcategory* Code Frequency (%)† Percentage within each main category
(column %)†
Technical
(N = 88)
External T-ex 19 (2%) 22%
Design TD 26 (3%) 30%
Construction TC 13 (2%) 15%
Materials TM 33 (4%) 38%
Human
(N = 375)
External H-ex 260 (31%) 69%
Knowledge based Knowledge HKK 30 (4%) 8%
Rule based Qualifications HRQ 16 (2%) 4%
Coordination HRC 34 (4%) 9%
Verification HRV 52 (6%) 14%
Intervention HRI 82 (10%) 22%
Monitoring HRM 28 (3%) 7%
Skill based Slips HSS 5 (1%) 1%
Tripping HST 3 (0%) 1%
Organisational
(N = 186)
External O-ex 108 (13%) 58%
Protocols OP 35 (4%) 19%
Transfer of knowledge OK 17 (2%) 9%
Management priorities OM 32 (4%) 17%
Culture OC 19 (2%) 10%
Patient related
(N = 20)
Patient related PRF 20 (2%) 100%
Other
(N = 13)
Other X 13 (2%) 100%
Total 845 (100%)
* See Table 1 for description of categories.
† More than one causal factor per event possible.Page 9 of 11
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minor patient inconvenience. However, since large num-
bers of patients visit the ED, the accumulated effect of the
events on patient well-being and the healthcare delivery
system is likely to be large.
The information on unintended events may help target
research and interventions to increase patient safety. It
seems worthwhile to direct interventions on the collabo-
ration between the ED and other hospital departments,
because a large number of unintended events occur in the
collaboration with departments outside the ED and nearly
half of all causes were external.
The causes of the unintended events were mainly human,
though since latent factors -organisational and technical-
were established as well, and believing that various
human causes can be captured by building organisational
and technical defences, we recommend to explore effec-
tive system interventions to improve patient safety in the
emergency setting.
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